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Abstract—In this paper, we consider an unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) assisted communications system, including two
cooperative UAVs, a wireless-powered ground destination node
leveraging simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) technique, and a terrestrial passive eavesdropper. One
UAV delivers confidential information to destination and the other
sends jamming signals to against eavesdropping and assist desti-
nation with energy harvesting. Assuming UAVs have partial infor-
mation about eavesdropper’s location, we propose two transmis-
sion schemes: friendly UAV jamming (FUJ) and Gaussian jam-
ming transmission (GJT) for the cases when jamming signals are
known and unknown a priori at destination, respectively. Then,
we formulate an average secrecy rate maximization problem to
jointly optimize the transmission power and trajectory of UAVs,
and the power splitting ratio of destination. Being non-convex
and hence difficult to solve the formulated problem, we propose
a computationally efficient iterative algorithm based on block
coordinate descent and successive convex approximation to obtain
a suboptimal solution. Finally, numerical results are provided
to substantiate the effectiveness of our proposed multiple-UAV
schemes, compared to other existing benchmarks. Specifically, we
find that the FUJ demonstrates significant secrecy performance
improvement in terms of the optimal instantaneous and average
secrecy rate compared to the GJT and the conventional single-
UAV counterpart.
Index Terms—UAV communications, PHY-security, SWIPT,
trajectory design, power control, cooperative mobile jammer,
convex optimization.
I INTRODUCTION
R
ECENTLY, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has been
deemed as a promising wireless service provider along-
side with plethora of other civilian applications (see [1]–
[4] and references therein). This is driven by advances in
wireless equipment miniaturization as well as the economic
ease of deployment and flexibility of UAVs inasmuch as
various Tech giants (e.g. Facebook and Google) [5] have been
focusing on establishing massive UAV-assisted networks for
ubiquitous connectivity. As a matter of fact, the upsurge of
UAV applications in wireless communications is double-edged
sword; in that bringing new opportunities and facilitating novel
technologies, while accompanying with undeniable critical
challenges when employed in the real world.
“This research was supported by the Australian Research Council under
Grant DP160100528.”
On the one hand, with an increasing demand of Internet-of-
things (IoT) applications, UAVs equipped with various types
of sensors, cameras, GPS, and so on, can be regarded as good
candidates to serve as aerial base stations/legitimate termi-
nals/mobile relaying and even power beacons for prolonging
energy-constraint IoT devices [6]–[10]. In such applications,
a challenging issue is that how to prolong device lifetime
due to limited access to power resources and/or infrequent
battery replacements [7]. To tackle this problem, apart from
conventional energy harvesting techniques, simultaneous wire-
less information and power transfer (SWIPT) has recently
emerged [11]. To be specific, SWIPT captures both data and
energy from the same radio frequency (RF) signal and con-
verts into direct current for battery recharging, which enables
energy harvesting in a controllable manner. This characteristic
is particularly important for UAV applications to guarantee
replenishable-energy ground nodes considering their dynamic
adjustment capability [8], [10], [12], [13]. Specifically, a
SWIPT-based UAV-aided relaying scenario to transmit power
and confidential information to an energy-constrained ground
user has been analyzed in terms of average achievable secrecy
rate and energy coverage probability in [12], while the secrecy
rate lower bound optimization problem of such setup has
been conducted in [10]. Aiming at minimization of the UAV’s
total power consumption, the authors in [13] also explored a
non-security UAV-based wireless communications system with
energy harvesting to enable data transmission of ground users
in both half duplex and full duplex modes using the harvested
energy.
On the other hand, safeguarding such wireless communi-
cations system is of the most paramount challenges due to
the broadcast nature of transmission and mobility of UAVs.
To guarantee security of UAV communications, physical-
layer (PHY) security [1], [14]–[22] have, providentially, been
ascertained as a promising and computationally-efficient in-
formation secrecy approach. For example, the resource al-
location problem for a UAV-assisted secure SWIPT system
is investigated in [15]. The authors in [18] also considered
the PLS of a four-node setup with UAV-enabled relaying
where the eavesdroppers are distributed in a certain area with
partially known location information and then studied the
power allocation problem of the source and relay. Amongst
various PHY-security techniques, cooperative jamming is one
2viable anti-eavesdropping strategy via collaboratively trans-
mitting jamming signals to degrade wiretap channel quality.
In [19], the authors have considered a mobile UAV serving
as a flying base station delivering data to a ground node
in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. In [20], lever-
aging the mobility of a UAV, the authors have studied the
achievable secrecy rate via trajectory design and power control
optimization, and showed its improvement over conventional
static jammers. This is due to the fact that the mobility of
UAV-jammer allows an opportunistically jamming at a closer
distance to the eavesdropper. In [21], the authors have tackled
maximizing the minimum secrecy rate of jammer-incorporated
UAV communications via a joint optimization of trajectory and
transmit power of UAVs. In [22], the authors have studied
the problem when a UAV is employed as friendly jammer
to assist secure communication in the presence of unknown
eavesdropper location, and they have examined the UAV-
jammer displacement and power control to guarantee good
reliability and security.
Motivated by above research, in this paper, we consider
two flying cooperative UAVs as well as a ground destination
node equipped with wireless RF energy harvester, in the
presence of a passive ground eavesdropper. One UAV acts
as source transmitting confidential information to destination
while the other UAV broadcasts jamming signals to assist anti-
eavesdropping and energy harvesting of the destination node.
Note that, different from [19], [23], [24], we here consider a
SWIPT-enabled receiver at destination for security and energy
scavenging. Also, different from [24], [25] wherein UAVs
know the exact location of eavesdropper, we here assume
that UAVs have only partial information of eavesdropper’s
location. Following our setting, we make the following con-
tributions in the paper.
• We propose two cooperative UAV-jamming PHY-security
schemes: friendly UAV jamming (FUJ) and Gaussian
jamming transmission (GJT). In particular, in FUJ, UAV
transmits jamming signals that are known a priori at
destination, while in GJT, destination node has no prior
information of the jamming signals from UAV.
• Via trajectory discretization approach, we formulate an
average secrecy rate (ASR) optimization problem, which
is challenging to solve due to non-smooth and non-
concave objective function and non-convex feasible set.
• To make the optimization problem tractable, we propose
an efficient iterative algorithm based on block coordinate
descent (BCD) and successive convex approximation
(SCA) methods in order to find a unique sub-optimal
solution to the problem with guaranteed convergence.
• Via the proposed iterative algorithm, we conduct opti-
mization of the following sub-problems: transmit power
of UAVs, power splitting ratio in SWIPT, as well as UAVs
trajectory.
• We compare by simulations secrecy and energy harvest-
ing performance, transmit power of UAVs of our pro-
posed schemes under various scenarios, demonstrating its
significant performance improvement over conventional
without-jamming (WoJ) scheme, wherein there exists no
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Fig. 1: System model of UAV-enabled secure information and
power transfer.
UAV-jammer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces system model. Section III presents two 2-UAV
transmission schemes via cooperative UAV jamming. In Sec-
tion IV, we formulate ASR optimization problem via trajectory
discretization approach and provide solutions in Section V.
Simulation results are given in Section VI, followed by con-
clusions in Section VII.
II SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a UAV-enabled wireless communications sys-
tem (see Fig. 1), where a UAV-source (S) flies from ini-
tial to final locations to deliver confidential information to
a legitimate ground destination (D) in the presence of a
ground eavesdropper (E) with unknown location. Here, we
consider D to be an energy-limited IoT device that is capable
of harvesting energy from ambient radio resources and its
receiver adopts power splitting architecture for simultaneous
energy scavenging and data decoding with a power splitting
ratio (PSR) ζ (0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1) [7], [26]. Finally, a UAV-jammer (J )
is employed to transmit noise-like jamming signals coopera-
tively to improve security and power the energy-constraint D.
We consider that all nodes have single omnidirectional
antenna that operate in half-duplex mode. We define main
link (S-D), wiretap link (S-E), jamming link (J -D, J -E),
as shown in Fig. 1.
II-A System Parameters
Without loss of generality, we assume that all the nodes
are located in a three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system
with the following parameters:
• D has the horizontal coordinate WD ∈ R
2×1 with zero
altitude,
• S and J ’s initial and final locations corresponding to the
prespecified launching and landing sites of the UAVs are
3QSI ∈ R
2×1, QJI ∈ R
2×1, QSF ∈ R
2×1, and QJF ∈
R2×1, with constant flying altitude1 H .
• S and J have the same mission time T , and their horizon-
tal location at time instant t ∈ [0, T ] are QS(t) ∈ R
2×1
and QJ(t) ∈ R
2×1,
• S and J have a safety distance D˜ to avoid collision2,
• S and J have total transmission power P totS and jamming
power P totJ , respectively, whereas at t ∈ [0, T ], their
associate instantaneous powers are PS(t) and PJ(t),
• PSR, denoted by ζ ∈ (0, 1), is the fraction of received
power for information processing, while (1-ζ) is the
fraction of which to be harvested and stored for future
use. The instantaneous PSR is, therefore, denoted by ζ(t).
Further, we have the following assumptions on D and E’s
locations:
• D’s location is known to both UAVs (e.g. [28], [19]),
• E’s location (WE ∈ R
2×1) is unknown, but both UAVs
can approximately estimate it [29] in a collaborative
manner. As such, we assume that E’s circular estimated
region centered at WˆE ∈ R
2×1 (namely most-likely
location of E) with radius RE ≥ ‖WE − WˆE‖ (namely
maximum estimation error) are known to the UAVs,
where ‖ · ‖ represents the L2-norm (Euclidean norm).
Remark: Note that according to [16], the availability of the
eavesdroppersâA˘Z´ location information can be classified into
three cases: I) full position information, II) partial position
information, and III) absence of position information. Case
I becomes possible, when the eavesdroppers stay stationary,
and UAV is equipped with an optical camera or a synthetic
aperture radar to detect the eavesdropper’s location, or it
might be the case when the ground nodes are part of the
same network with different roles; e.g., unscheduled users to
receive particular information compared to the intended ones.
Other method is presented in [28] to obtain eavesdropper’s
location information from the local oscillator power which
is inadvertently leaked from its RF front-end, given coherent
detection is used. Case II occurs when the above detection
is non-accurate, or when eavesdroppers have moved slightly
so that the camera/aperture radar in UAV cannot perfectly
obtain their location information. Case III occurs when all
the above detection methods are failed and eavesdroppers
hide themselves physically very well. In this paper, we have
considered Case II.
II-B Channel Model
Motivated by literature (see [25], [27], [30]–[33]), in this
work, we adopt a probabilistic line-of-sight (LOS) channel
model that models both LoS and Non-LoS propagations by
taking into account their occurrence probabilities [30]. Av-
eraging over surrounding environment and small-scale fading,
1Indeed, one justification from a practical viewpoint behind this constant
UAVs’ flying altitude assumption is to guarantee the safety consideration like
collision avoidance with buildings or terrain, and also more importantly, for
energy consumption reduction when ascending or descending of UAVs, e.g.,
[23], [27].
2This is different from the traditional approach in [21], where different
flying altitudes are allocated to each UAV to avoid possible collision.
the expected channel power of UAV-ground (UG) links at time
instant t is [30]
hˆag(t) = βˆ(θag(t))dag(t)
−α, (1)
with the regularized attenuation factor given by
βˆ(θag(t)) , β0 [PLoS(θag(t)) + κ(1 − PLoS(θag(t)))] , (2)
where dag(t) =
√
‖Qa(t)−Wg‖2 +H2 represents the time
varying distance between the aerial node a and the ground
node g. Moreover, θag(t) = tan
−1
(
H
dag(t)
)
denotes the time-
varing elevation-angle between those two, wherein a ∈{S, J }
and g ∈{D, E}, α denotes the path-loss exponent (2 ≤ α ≤ 4)
[34], β0 is the path loss at reference distance d0 meter for
omnidirectional antennas under LoS, i.e.,
β0 , 20 log10
(
C
4πd0fc
)
, (in dB)
where C = 3 × 108 m/s is the speed of light and fc is
the carrier frequency [34]. The parameter κ is the additional
attenuation factor characterizing Non-LoS propagation (in
practice it is a random variable with log-normal distribution
denoting the shadowing effect); however, in (2), this parameter
is regarded to be constant following homogeneous assumption
for Non-LoS environment. Here, In consistent with [30], [35],
we assume that for the area of interest the elevation angle
dependent probabilistic LoS function
PLoS(θ(t)) =
1
1 + k1 exp(−k2(θ(t) − k1))
,
with environmental constants k1, k2 > 0 follow homogeneity,
leading ultimately to βˆ(θ(t)) ≈ β¯ for the sake of simplicity
of trajectory and resource allocation design3.
III PROPOSED PHY-SECURITY SCHEMES AND
INSTANTANEOUS/AVERAGE SECRECY CAPACITY
In this work, we present two PHY-security schemes in-
volving two UAVs. Major difference between our schemes
and other known two-UAV schemes (e.g. [21], [24], [25])
lies in that the additional cooperative UAV conducts not only
jamming transmission but also powering D in a more practical
channel modelling:
• A FUJ scheme, wherein FUJ transmits jamming signals
that are known a priori at D
• A GJT scheme, wherein D has no prior knowledge4 of
the noise-like jamming signal.
3It is worth pointing out that this approximated and simplified model is
too fruitful in some applications such as post-disaster area wherein it is non-
trivial to categorize the environment based on which the probabilistic model
has been developed. However, the minimum and maximum values of path-loss
component α can be used for upper and lower bound performance [2].
4Note that while the FUJ scheme requires a priori to generate jamming
signals at J and also costs a higher computational complexity at D to
operate jamming cancellation, it can be implemented via various approaches
such as key-assisted coding; i.e., an intelligent combination of conventional
cryptography with PHY-security [36]. Specially, when the location of the
eavesdropper E is unknown to the legitimate nodes and the wiretap link
quality might experience a better channel condition compared to the main
link, the former scheme is capable of PHY-security enhancement, while the
latter lacks such an undeniable performance advantage nonetheless provides
a low complex implementation approach.
4To evaluate performance of above schemes (particularly in
later simulations), we consider a benchmark scheme:
• No additional UAV-jammer (WoJ) scheme with SWIPT at
destination. Note that this setup is similar to [19], except
[19] has no SWIPT.
III-A Instantaneous Secrecy Rate (ISR)
Recall system parameters in subsection II-A and assume
normalized bandwidth in all links.
GJT has the achievable average rate over the random
channel realizations at time instant t as
IM (t)=log2
(
1+
γS(t)ζ(t)
(
‖QS(t)−WD‖
2+H2
)−α
2
γJ(t)ζ(t) (‖QJ(t)−WD‖2+H2)
−α
2+1
)
, (3)
where γS(t)
∆
= PS(t)β¯N0 and γJ(t)
∆
= PJ (t)β¯N0 with N0 being the
noise power at the receiver of D. Since the UAV jamming
signal is known a priori by D as well as the channel state
information (CSI) is available, it can be removed from the
received signals. Therefore, FUJ has the achievable instanta-
neous ensumble rate from S to D as
IM (t)=log2
(
1+γS(t)ζ(t)
(
‖QS(t)−WD‖
2+H2
)−α
2
)
. (4)
Additionally, for both GJT and FUJ, the exact instantaneous
wiretap channel capacity IˆE(t) at eavesdropper can be ob-
tained as
IˆE(t)=log2
(
1+
γS(t)
(
‖QS(t)−WE‖
2 +H2
)−α
2
γJ(t) (‖QJ(t)−WE‖2 +H2)
−α
2+1
)
, (5)
where the AWGN noise power at E is considered identical to
that at D for the simplicity of exposition.
The maximum achievable data rate by E , denoted by
ImaxE (t), within the uncertainty region RE , which serves as
an upper-bound for the case of exact location of E , can be
calculated, by considering the worst-case estimation scenario
by two UAVs, as
ImaxE (t)=log2
1+
γS(t)
((
‖QS(t)−WˆE‖−RE
)2
+H2
)−α
2
γJ(t)
((
‖QJ(t)−WˆE‖+RE
)2
+H2
)−α
2
+1
 .
(6)
Proof. Please see Appendix A. 
III-B Average Secrecy Capacity
The achievable ASR from S to D with normalized trans-
mission bandwidth is defined in bits/s/Hz as [37]
R¯sec =
1
T
∫ T
0
[IM (t)− I
max
E (t)]+ dt, (7)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0} and IM (t) for GJT and FUJ schemes
are given in (3) and (4), respectively, ImaxE (t) is in (6) for
cooperative jamming. Note that ImaxE (t) for WoJ is identical
to (6) but with setting γJ (t) = 0.
IV PROBLEM FORMULATION FOR MAXIMIZING ASR
To maximize (7), we need a joint design of UAV trajectory,
transmission power allocations, and power splitting ratio. To
make our design practically feasible, we consider the trajec-
tory discretization approach dividing the mission time T into
N equally-spaced time slots
δt
∆
=
T
N
,
Given δt, assuming distance variation between any UAV and
the ground terminals is adequately small, we adopt constant
average channel gains per slot. Other system design param-
eters and definitions are quantized accordingly and being
constant within each time slot. Hence, our problem of inter-
est with variables PS
∆
= {PS [n]}
N
n=1, PJ
∆
= {PJ [n]}
N
n=1,
ζ
∆
= {ζ[n]}Nn=1, QS
∆
= {QS[n]}
N
n=1, and QJ
∆
= {QJ [n]}
N
n=1
is formulated as
R¯optsec (P
⋆
S,P
⋆
J, ζ
⋆,Q⋆S,Q
⋆
J) = maximize
1
N
N∑
n=1
[
R˜sec[n]
]
+
s.t. C1− C15, (8)
with R˜sec[n] given by (9) (shown on top of the next page)
wherein H˜2
∆
= R2E +H
2. The constraints C1-C4 are
C1 :
1
N
N∑
n=1
PS [n] ≤ P¯S , C2 : 0 ≤ PS [n] ≤ PˆS , (10)
C3 :
1
N
N∑
n=1
PJ [n] ≤ P¯J , C4 : 0 ≤ PJ [n] ≤ PˆJ , (11)
where (C1,C3) and (C2,C4) are constraints of average
and maximum transmission/jamming powers per time slot
at S and J , i.e., (P¯S , P¯J ) and (PˆS , PˆJ ), respectively, where
P¯S
∆
= P totS /N, P¯J
∆
= P totJ /N.
Additionally, these fixed powers are chosen subject to the peak
to average power ratio (PAPR) constraint, i.e., PˆK
P¯K
is restricted
due to hardware limitations, whereK ∈ {S, J}, and maximum
network transmission power per time slot as
PˆR = PˆS + PˆJ . (12)
To ensure a sufficient discretization as well as valid assump-
tions of invariant channel condition and unchanged distance
between any UAV and ground nodes, we have mobility con-
straints as
C5 : QS[1] = QSI ,
C6 : ‖QS[n+ 1]−QS [n]‖
∆
= VS [n]δt ≤ d˜δ, n = 1 · · ·N−1
C7 : ‖QSF−QS[N ]‖
∆
= VS [N ]δt ≤ d˜δ, (13)
and
C8 : QJ [1] = QJI ,
C9 : ‖QJ [n+ 1]−QJ [n]‖
∆
= VJ [n]δt ≤ d˜δ, n = 1 · · ·N−1
C10 : ‖QJF −QJ [N ]‖
∆
= VJ [N ]δt ≤ d˜δ, (14)
5R˜sec[n] = log2
(
1 +
ζ[n]PS [n]β¯
(
‖QS[n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2
ζ[n]PJ [n]β¯ (‖QJ [n]−WD‖2 +H2)
−α
2 +N0
)
− log2
1 + PS [n]β¯
(
‖QS[n]− WˆE‖
2 − 2RE‖QS[n]− WˆE‖+ H˜
2
)−α
2
PJ [n]β¯
(
‖QJ [n]− WˆE‖2 + 2RE‖QJ [n]− WˆE‖+ H˜2
)−α
2
+N0
 , (9)
where VS [n] and VJ [n] are constant speeds of S and J in time
slot n, but the velocities may vary from one slot to next. In par-
ticular, the maximum horizontal displacement of S and J per
slot is bounded by threshold maximum distance d˜δ ≪ H .
For the considered two-UAV system, collision avoidance is
represented by
C11 : ‖QS[n]−QJ [n]‖ ≥ D˜, (15)
where D˜ is the safety distance between the two UAVs. Then,
the permitted flying zone for UAVs is assumed to be a circular
region with radius R˜, i.e.,
C12 : ‖QS [n]−WD‖ ≤ R˜,
C13 : ‖QJ [n]−WD‖ ≤ R˜, (16)
where
R˜ ≤
√√√√( PˆRβ¯
ΨH
) 2
α
−H2, (17)
must be satisfied to avoid power outage and guarantee the
viability of energy harvesting. In (17), ΨH is the minimum
required input power for energy harvesting, and PˆR is given
in (12). Finally, energy harvesting constraints are
C14 : 0 ≤ ζ[n] < 1,
C15 : E˜H [n] ≥ ΨH , ∀n (18)
with harvested power in time slot n given by (19) (see top of
the next page) where η is power conversion efficiency factor,
ζ[n] represents the discretized PSR for information processing
at D, and (1− ζ[n]) for energy harvesting.
V PROBLEM SOLUTION TO MAXIMIZE ASR
Note that (8) is non-convex and challenging to solve due to
non-convex objective function, non-smooth operator, [·]+, and
some non-convex constraints. However, at the optimal point,
R˜sec[n] in (9) should be non-negative; otherwise, by setting
PS [n] = 0 yields R˜sec[n] = 0 (It should be pointed out
that due to inequality max{x, 0} ≥ x, the resultant smooth
objective function given by (9) always serves a lower-bound
for the objective function of the problem (8)). Thus, our
optimization problem can be turned into a non-convex yet
smooth (differentiable) problem as
(P1) : maximize
PS, PJ, ζ , QS, QJ
1
N
N∑
n=1
R˜sec[n]
s.t. C1− C15. (20)
The facts that, (P1) is non-convex and the optimization
parameters are tightly coupled due to C15, make the prob-
lem intractable and motivates us to propose an alternating
optimization approach: an efficient iterative algorithm based
on block coordinate descent (BCD) and successive convex
approximation (SCA) methods, where at each iteration a
single block of variables is optimized by convex optimization
approach, while the remaining variables remain unchanged.
By doing so, the convergence of the proposed approach to at
least a sub-optimal solution is guaranteed under a feasible set
[38]. The remaining analysis are given as follows.
V-A Optimal Transmit Power of UAV-source
In the following, we optimize the power allocation of S for
GJT, FUJ, and WoJ, under the given feasible trajectories and
PSRs. Thus, the sub-problem for optimal transmission of S for
the most general case (GJT) can be obtained by reformulating
(P1) equivalently as
(P2) : maximize
PS
N∑
n=1
[log (1+AnPS [n])−log (1+BnPS [n])]
s.t. C1 and C2,
C˜15 : CnPS [n] +Dn ≥ ΨH , ∀n (21)
where log(·) represents natural logarithm, the auxiliary con-
stants {An}
N
n=1, {Bn}
N
n=1, {Cn}
N
n=1, and {Dn}
N
n=1, are given
by
An =
γ0ζ[n]
(
‖QS[n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2
ζ[n]γJ [n] (‖QJ [n]−WD‖2 +H2)
−α
2 + 1
, (22)
Bn=
γ0
(
‖QS[n]−WˆE‖
2−2RE‖QS[n]−WˆE‖+H˜
2
)−α
2
γJ [n]
(
‖QJ [n]−WˆE‖2+ 2RE‖QJ [n]−WˆE‖+H˜2
)−α
2
+1
,
(23)
Cn = ηβ¯ (1− ζ[n])
(
‖QS[n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2 , (24)
Dn=η (1−ζ[n])
[
PJ [n]β¯
(
‖QJ [n]−WD‖
2+H2
)−α
2+N0
]
, (25)
where γ0
∆
= β¯N0 , γJ [n]
∆
= PJ [n]β¯N0 , and H˜ =
√
R2E +H
2.
The sub-problem (P2) is still non-convex with respect to PS
due to non-convex objective function. Since one can readily
verify that problem (P2) satisfies the Slater’s condition, strong
duality attains which enables us to obtain the optimal solution
by solving the corresponding Lagrange dual problem using
6E˜H [n]
∆
= η (1− ζ[n])
[
PS [n]β¯
(
‖QS[n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2 + PJ [n]β¯
(
‖QJ [n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2 +N0
]
, (19)
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. As such, by temporar-
ily dropping C2 and C˜15, and also letting P˜S and (P˜S , λ) be
any primal and dual optimal points with zero duality gap, the
Lagrangian function can be computed as
L (PS, λ) =
N∑
n=1
[
log(1+BnPS [n])−log(1+AnPS [n])+λ
(
PS [n]−P¯S
)]
, (26)
where λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange factor. Then, maximizing the
Lagrangian dual function defined as
g (λ)
∆
= inf
PS
{L (PS, λ)},
one can reach the optimality condition as [37]
An
1 +AnPS [n]
−
Bn
1 +BnPS [n]
− λ = 0, ∀n (27)
Solving the above equation with respect to PS [n] and also tak-
ing into account constraints C2 and C˜15, leads to the closed-
form analytical solution for optimal UAV-source’s power allo-
cation as
P ⋆S [n]=

min
{
max
{[
ΨH−Dn
Cn
]
+
, P˜S [n]
}
, PˆS
}
, An≥Bn[
ΨH−Dn
Cn
]
+
, An<Bn
(28)
where
P˜S [n]=
1
2
√( 1
Bn
−
1
An
)2
+
4
λ
(
1
Bn
−
1
An
)
−
(
1
Bn
+
1
An
) , (29)
wherein the non-negative Lagrange factor λ can be obtained
by applying a simple bisection search such that the UAV’s
source power budget constraint; i.e.,
N∑
n=1
P ⋆S [n] ≤ P
tot
S ,
is satisfied.
We note that, for FUJ, the optimal S power allocation P⋆S ,
following the similar approach to GJT, can be obtained as (28)
by removing the term ζ[n]γJ [n]
(
‖QJ [n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2
from denominator of (22). Likewise, the optimal S power
allocation for the WoJ is given by (28) by letting PJ [n] equals
to zero in (22), (23), and (25).
V-B Optimal Transmit Power of UAV-jammer
Under keeping other variables unchanged, we aim at op-
timizing the jamming transmit power for GJT and FUJ. As
such, the sub-problem for optimization of the transmit power
of J for GJT can be obtained by rewriting (P1) as
(P3) : maximize
PJ
N∑
n=1
log
(
1+
An
BnPJ [n]+1
)
−log
(
1+
Cn
DnPJ [n]+1
)
s.t. C3, C˜4 :
[
ΨH−En
Fn
]
+
≤PJ [n]≤ PˆJ , ∀n (30)
where the auxiliary constants {An}
N
n=1, {Bn}
N
n=1, {Cn}
N
n=1,
{Dn}
N
n=1, {En}
N
n=1, {Fn}
N
n=1 are taken as
An=ζ[n]γS [n]
(
‖QS[n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2 , (31)
Bn=γ0ζ[n]
(
‖QJ [n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2 , (32)
Cn=γS [n]
(
‖QS [n]−WˆE‖
2−2RE‖QS[n]−WˆE‖+H˜
2
)−α
2
, (33)
Dn=γ0
(
‖QJ [n]−WˆE‖
2+ 2RE‖QJ [n]−WˆE‖+H˜
2
)−α
2
, (34)
En=η (1−ζ[n])
[
PS [n]β¯
(
‖QS [n]−WD‖
2+H2
)−α
2+N0
]
, (35)
Fn=ηβ¯ (1− ζ[n])
(
‖QJ [n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2 . (36)
The sub-problem (P3) is still non-convex5 with respect to PJ
due to non-convex objective function being in the form of
convex-minus-convex based on Lemma 1 given below.
Lemma 1. Let x ∈ RN×1 be a vector of variables, {an}
N
n=1
and {bn}
N
n=1 be all non-negative constants. Then, the vector
function defined as
f(x) =
N∑
n=1
log
(
1 +
an
bnx[n] + 1
)
, (37)
is convex.
Proof. By calculating the gradient vector and also obtaining
the Hessian matrix of f(x) we have
∇f(x) =
{
−
anbn
(1 + an + bnx[n])(1 + bnx[n])
}N
n=1
, (38)
Hf = diag
(
anb
2
n(an + 2bnx[n] + 2)
(bnx[n] + 1)2(an + bnx[n] + 1)2
)
, (39)
where ∇(·) and H represent gradient and Hessian operators,
respectively. The convexity of f(x) follows from the fact that
the Hessian matrix given by (39) is positive semi-definite.
Since it is in a diagonal form with all non-negative elements,
which further implies that all the eigenvalues corresponding
to the Hessian matrix are non-negative. This completes the
proof. 
5Note that compared to S’s optimal power allocation (P2), which we could
solve the non-convex but differentiable problem analytically via its Lagrange
dual approach, the objective function of (P4) is quite sophisticated inasmuch
as the Lagrange method leads to a harder problem to solve analytically.
Therefore, here we employ another technique.
7Since the first term of the objective function to be maxi-
mized is convex, our approach is two-fold: approximating this
convex term with its corresponding concave lower bound, and
applying SCA in an iterative manner. By doing so, we are able
to reach an approximate solution with guaranteed convergence.
Specifically, we replace the first convex term (P3) with its first
order Taylor expansion at {P kJ [n]}
N
n=1, which is defined as the
given transmit power of J at iteration k. It is worth mentioning
that based on first-order condition [39], the first order Taylor
approximation at the local point x0 ∈ R
N×1 provides a global
under-estimator of a convex function f(x), i.e.,
f(x) ≥ f(x0) +∇f(x)
T (x − x0), (40)
where (·)† represents transpose operator. Thus, for any given
local point at iteration k; i.e., PkJ = {p
k
J [n]}
N
n=1, (P3) turns
into an approximated convex problem as
(P4) : maximize
PJ
N∑
n=1
Bˆn + AˆnPJ [n]− log
(
1+
Cn
DnPJ [n]+1
)
s.t. C3 and C˜4, ∀n (41)
where
Aˆn = −
AnBn
(1+An+BnP kJ [n])(1 +BnP
k
J [n])
, (42)
Bˆn = log
(
1 +
An
BnP kJ [n] + 1
)
, (43)
Note that (P4) is a convex problem for which the Slater’s
conditions can be readily verified, any points P⋆J and (P
⋆
J, λ
⋆)
satisfying the KKT conditions are primal and dual optimal
with zero duality gap, which implies that the dual optimum is
attained. Although problem (P4) can be numerically solved
by any standard convex optimization techniques such as the
interior-point method [39], we are going to step further and
apply Lagrangian method to gain more insight into structure
of the sub-optimal solution and also effectively reduce the
complexity of the algorithm. As such, temporarily dropping
the constraint C˜4, the Lagrange dual function is written as
g (PJ, ν) =
inf
PJ
{
N∑
n=1
[
−AˆnPJ [n]−Bˆn+log
(
1+
Cn
DnPJ [n]+1
)
+ν
(
PJ [n]−P¯J
)]}
,
(44)
where the non-negative scalar ν is the Lagrange multiplier
corresponding to C˜3 in (P5). Then, solving ∇g (PJ, ν) = 0
results in the optimality condition as
1
PJ [n] +
1+Cn
Dn
−
1
PJ [n] +
1
Dn
+ ν − Aˆn = 0, (45)
which can be rewritten as
PJ
2[n]+
(
2 + Cn
Dn
)
PJ [n]+
[
1 + Cn
D2n
−
Cn
Dn(ν − Aˆn)
]
=0, (46)
Finally, solving the equation above while considering con-
straint C˜4; we reach the optimal solution ofP⋆J = {P
⋆
J [n]}
N
n=1
as
P ⋆J [n] =
min
max


√
4CnDn
ν−Aˆn
+C2n−(Cn+2)
2Dn
,[ΨH−En
Fn
]
+
,PˆJ
 .
(47)
where ν ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier at optimal point, satis-
fying
∑N
n=1 P
⋆
J [n] ≤ P
tot
J , which can be attained by a simple
bisection search. We note that (P4) is a lower-bound to (P3)
but with the same constraints, so the solution to (P4), i.e., P⋆J ,
is no less than that of (P3) at the given point
(
Bˆn, Aˆn,P
k
J
)
.
Similarly, for the FUJ scheme the optimal J power allocation
P⋆J is obtained as (47) but with setting Aˆn = 0.
V-C Optimal power splitting ratio
We aim at designing an efficient power splitter at desti-
nation D. For fixed PK and QK, where K ∈{S, J }, the
equivalent sub-problem for optimizing PSR {ζ[n]}Nn=1 of both
GJT and FUJ, is recasted as
(P6) : maximize
ζ
N∑
n=1
[
log
(
1 +
Anζ[n]
Bnζ[n] + 1
)]
s.t. C˜14 : 0 ≤ ζ[n] ≤
[
1−
ΨH
ηCn
]
+
, ∀n (48)
where the auxiliary constants for n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} are
defined as
An = γS [n]
(
‖QS[n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2 , (49)
Bn = γJ [n]
(
‖QJ [n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2 , (50)
Cn = PS [n]β¯
(
‖QS[n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2
+ PJ [n]β¯
(
‖QJ [n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2 +N0, (51)
It can be verified from Lemma 2 that the problem (P6) is
concave and its objective function is monotonically increasing.
Lemma 2. Let x > 0 be a scalar variable and a and b
be positive constants. Define f(x) = log
(
ax
bx+1 + 1
)
. Taking
the first and the second derivative of f(x) with respect
to x results in Df(x) = a(bx+1)(ax+bx+1) and D
2f(x) =
−a(2abx+a+2b(bx+1))(bx+1)2(ax+bx+1)2 respectively, where D is the differenti-
ation operator. Since for any value of x in the domain of f
we have Df(x) > 0 and D2f(x) < 0, this illustrates that
the function is strictly concave being monotonic increasing.
Besides, we know that the log-product function or equivalently
h =
∑
log(x) where x = {xi}
N
i=1 is concave and non-
increasing with respect to each argument xi. Therefore, from
the vector composition law [39] one can readily conclude that
g(x) = hof(x) = h(f(x1), f(x2), · · · , f(xN )) is concave.
Therefore, the analytical solution for ζ⋆ for GJT scenario
can be readily obtained as
ζ⋆[n] =
[
1−
ΨH
ηC[n]
]
+
, (52)
8For FUJ and WoJ, replacing the constants Bn = 0 and Cn =
PS [n]β¯
(
‖QS[n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2 +N0 with (50) and (51),
respectively, one can apply similar approach in (52) to obtain
the optimal solution ζ⋆.
V-D Optimal UAV-source trajectory design
We now aim at optimizing the approximated path of S of-
fline for the three schemes in terms of ASR under given
the other variables. The corresponding sub-problem of S-
trajectory design for GJT is reformulated as
(P7) : maximize
QS
N∑
n=1
logΦ1(QS [n])
s.t. C5− C7, C11− C13,
C˜15 : Cn
(
‖QS[n]−WD‖
2+H2
)−α
2+Dn≥ΨH , (53)
where
Φ1(QS [n]) =
1+An
(
‖QS[n]−WD‖
2+H2
)−α
2
1+Bn
(
‖QS[n]−WˆE‖2− 2RE‖QS[n]−WˆE‖+H˜2
)−α
2
, (54)
An=
ζ[n]γS [n]
ζ[n]γJ [n] (‖QJ [n]−WD‖2 +H2)
−α
2 + 1
, (55)
Bn=
γS [n]
γJ [n]
(
‖QJ [n]−WˆE‖2+2RE‖QJ [n]−WˆE‖+H˜2
)−α
2
+1
, (56)
Cn=ηβ¯ (1− ζ[n])PS [n], (57)
Dn=η (1−ζ[n])
[
PJ [n]β¯
(
‖QJ [n]−WD‖
2+H2
)−α
2+N0
]
, (58)
The optimization problem (P7) is non-convex due to the fact
that the objective function is not concave with respect to QS[n]
and the constraintsC11 and C˜15 are not convex, therefore, it is
hard to solve optimally. To simplify it, we reformulate (P7) by
introducing the slack variables T = {T [1], T [2], · · · , T [N ]}
and U = {U [1], U [2], · · · , U [N ]} and obtain
(P8) : maximize
QS,T,U
N∑
n=1
log
1 +AnT
−α
2 [n]
1 +BnU−
α
2 [n]
s.t. C5− C7, C11− C13,
C˜15 : CnT
−α
2 [n]+Dn ≥ ΨH ,
C16 : ‖QS[n]−WD‖
2+H2−T [n] ≤ 0,
C17 : ‖QS[n]−WˆE‖
2−2RE‖QJ [n]−WˆE‖+H˜
2−U [n]≥0,
(59)
Note that C16 must hold with equality at the optimal point,
otherwise by decreasing T [n] one can increase the value of
objective function without violating any constraints, similarly
for C17. Then (P7) and (P8) are equivalent and have the
same optimal points. Next, based on Lemma 3, we observe
that the objective function of (P8) is in the form of convex-
minus-convex.
Lemma 3. Let define the function f(x; a, b) = log(1+ ax−b)
with non-negative parameters a and b. Taking the first and
second derivatives of the function with respect to x yields
Df = −
ab
x (a+ xb)
, D2f =
ab
(
a+ (b+ 1)xb
)
x2 (a+ xb)
2 , (60)
where f(x) is convex as D2f ≥ 0. Note that we implicitly
take the extended-value extension of f(x), i.e., f˜(x), which
is defined ∞ outside the domain of f(x) for the latter result.
Thus, the summation of convex functions results in a convex
function. This completes the proof.
Lemma 4. Let x be a vector of variables {xi}
N
i=1 and
a ∈ RN×1 be a constant vector . The function of negative
norm-squared of this two vectors; f(x) = −‖x− a‖2, which
obviously is a concave function with respect to the vector x,
has a convex upper-bound given by
−‖x− a‖2 ≤ ‖x0‖
2 − 2 (x0 − a)
†
x− ‖a‖2, (61)
Proof. See appendix B. 
Using Lemmas 3 and 4, we reformulate (P8) in an approxi-
mated convex form by having concave objective function with
convex feasible set as
(P9) : maximize
QS,T,U
N∑
n=1
AˆnT [n]− log
(
1+B[n]U−
α
2 [n]
)
s.t. C5− C7,
C˜11 : D˜2+‖QkS‖
2−2
(
QkS−Q
k
J
)†
QS [n]−‖Q
k
J‖
2 ≤ 0
C12− C13, C˜15 :
[
ΨH−Dn
Cn
]
+
T
α
2 [n]≤1, C16,
C˜17 : 2RE‖QS [n]−WˆE‖−2
(
QkS−WˆE
)†
QS[n]−U [n]+H˜≤0,
(62)
where H˜
∆
= ‖QkS[n]‖
2 − ‖WˆE‖
2 − H˜2. Besides,
Aˆn = −
αAn
2Tn
(
An + T
α
2
n
) , (63)
Note that C˜11 and C˜17 follow from Lemma 4. Additionally,
using C16 implies that T is non-negative such that T [n] ≥ H .
Therefore, for H ≥ 1, C˜15 is regarded as a convex constraint,
and therefore, (P9) being a convex problem can be optimally
solved by any known solvers, here, we use CVX [40]. Further,
for FUJ, the corresponding sub-problem of S-trajectory design
is similar to (P7) by replacing (55) with A[n] = ζ[n]γS [n],
and following similar approach taken above, the solution of
that problem can be obtained.
Finally, for the conventional case WoJ, the sub-problem
of S path planning with SWIPT at destination and partially
known E location is reformulated as
(P10) : maximize
QS
N∑
n=1
logΦ1(QS [n])
s.t. C5− C7,C12,
C˜15 : Cn
(
‖QS[n]−WD‖
2+H2
)−α
2+Dn ≥ ΨH , (64)
9where
An = ζ[n]γS [n], Bn = γS [n],
Cn = ηβ¯ (1−ζ[n])PS [n], Dn=η (1−ζ[n])N0. (65)
which is non-convex because of Lemma 3 or non-convex con-
straint C˜15, and therefore we obtain a convex approximated
problem of (P10) as
(P11) : maximize
QS,T,U
N∑
n=1
[
−AˆnT [n]−log
(
1+BnU
−α
2 [n]
)]
s.t. C5− C7,C12,
C˜15 :
[
ΨH −Dn
Cn
]
+
T
α
2 [n] ≤ 1,
C16 : ‖QS[n]−WD‖
2 +H2 − T [n] ≤ 0,
C˜17 : 2RE‖QS [n]−WˆE‖−2
(
QkS [n]−WˆE
)†
QS [n]−U [n]+H˜≤0,
(66)
Now (P11) is convex. With an initial point
(
QkS,T
k,Uk
)
,
we can solve it optimally with CVX.
V-E Optimal UAV-jammer trajectory design
We are finally after designing an optimal trajectory of J ,
provided that (PS,PJ, ζ ,QS) are given. For GJT, we formu-
late the sub-problem of J -trajectory design as
(P12) : maximize
QJ
N∑
n=1
log2Φ2(QJ [n])
s.t. C8− C11, C13,
C˜15 : En + Fn
(
‖QJ [n]−WD‖
2 +H2
)−α
2 ≥ ΨH , (67)
where for ∀n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, we have
Φ2(QJ [n])=
1+ An
Bn(‖QJ [n]−WD‖2+H2)
−
α
2 +1
1+ Cn
Dn(‖QJ [n]−WˆE‖2+2RE‖QJ [n]−WˆE‖+H˜2)
−
α
2 +1
,
(68)
An=ζ[n]γS [n]
(
‖QS[n]−WD‖
2+H2
)−α
2, Bn=ζ[n]γJ [n], (69)
Cn=γS [n]
(
‖QS[n]−WˆE‖
2−2RE‖QS[n]−WˆE‖+H˜
2
)−α
2
, (70)
En=η (1−ζ[n])
[
PS [n]β¯
(
‖QS [n]−WD‖
2+H2
)−α
2+N0
]
, (71)
Dn=γJ [n], Fn = ηβ¯ (1− ζ[n])PJ [n]. (72)
Reformulating problem (P12) by introducing the
slack variables S = {S[1], S[2], · · · , S[N ]} and
V = {V [1], V [2], · · · , V [N ]} yields
(P13) : maximize
QJ,S,V
N∑
n=1
log
 1 + AnBnS−α2 [n]+1
(1 + Cn
DnV
−
α
2 [n]+1

s.t. C8− C11, C13,
C˜15 : [ΨH − En]+ S[n]
α
2 ≤ Fn,
C16 : ‖QJ [n]−WD‖
2+H2−S[n]≥0, C17 : S[n]≥0,
C18 : ‖QJ [n]−WˆE‖
2+2RE‖QJ [n]−WˆE‖+H˜
2−V [n]≤0,
(73)
Lemma 5. Define the bivariate function f(x, y) =
log (1+a1 exp(x))+log (1+a2 exp(y)) , x, y > 0 with the non-
negative parameters a1 and a2 and the constraint a ≥ 1.
By taking the first and second derivative of the function with
respect to the variable x and obtaining the corresponding
gradient and Hessian of f , one can reach at
∇(f) = Df =
[
a1e
x
1 + a1 exp(x)
,
a2e
y
1 + a2 exp(y)
]†
, (74)
H(f) = D2f =
[
a1e
x
[1+a1 exp(x)]
2 0
0 a1e
y
[1+a1 exp(y)]
2
]
, (75)
Since matrix H is positive semidefinite for t > 0, the
function f(x, y) is convex. Therefore, its first Taylor expansion
providing a global under-estimator of f(x, y) at point (x0, y0)
is given by
f(x, y) ≥
f(x0, y0)+
[
a1e
x0
1+a1 exp(x0)
,
a2e
y0
1+a2 exp(y0)
]
(x−x0, y−y0)
†.
(76)
Based on Lemma 5, the objective function of (P13) is
in the form of convex-minus-convex with respect to V˜ [n] =
α
2 logV [n] and S˜[n] =
α
2 logS[n], i.e., it is still non-convex.
Hence, the approximated convex problem corresponding to
(P13) can be obtained as
(P14) : maximize
QJ,S˜,V˜
N∑
n=1
fLB[n]−log
(
1+b1e
S˜[n]
)
−log
(
1+b2e
V˜ [n]
)
s.t. C8− C10, C13,
C˜11 : D˜2+‖QkJ‖
2−2
(
QkJ−Q
k
S
)†
QJ [n]−‖Q
k
S‖
2≤0,
C˜15 : [ΨH−En]+ exp(S˜[n])≤Fn,
C˜16 : 2
(
QkJ [n]−WD
)†
QJ [n]−exp
(
2
α
S˜[n]
)
+H1≥0,
C˜18 : ‖QJ [n]−WˆE‖
2+2RE‖QJ [n]−WˆE‖+H˜
2≤In+JnV˜ [n],
(77)
where H1 = −‖Q
k
J [n]‖
2 + ‖WˆD‖
2 + H2 and the concave
lower-bound function fLB is given by
fLB[n]
∆
=
a1 exp
(
S˜k[n]
)
1 + a1 exp
(
S˜k[n]
) S˜[n]+ a2 exp
(
V˜ k[n]
)
1 + a2 exp
(
V˜ k[n]
) V˜ [n],
(78)
where a1 =
1+An
Bn
, a2 =
1
Dn
, b1 =
1
Bn
, b2 =
1+Cn
Dn
, In =(
1− 2α V˜k[n]
)
exp
(
2
α V˜k[n]
)
, and Jn =
2
α exp
(
2
α V˜k[n]
)
.
Note that constraints C˜11, C˜16, and C˜18 are obtained by
substituting the non-convex terms of the left hand side con-
straints C11, C16, and C18 of (P13) with their approximated
convex expressions using Lemma 4. Since (P14) is now
convex, we use CVX and [41] to solve it, given an initial point
(QkJ, S˜
k, V˜k), where the superscript k denotes iteration index.
Further, to optimize J -trajectory for FUJ, we solve (P13) by
removing the terms involving S˜[n] from its objective function.
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Algorithm 1: Proposed iterative algorithm
1: Initialize: Set initial feasible points P
(0)
S , P
(0)
J , ζ
(0),
Q
(0)
S , and Q
(0)
J , as well as put the initial values of slack
variables T(0) and U(0), S˜(0) and V˜(0), and let k = 0;
2: Repeat:
3: k ← k + 1;
4: Given P
(k−1)
J , ζ
(k−1), Q
(k−1)
S , and Q
(k−1)
J solve (P2)
using (28) updating P
(k)
S ;
5: Given P
(k)
S , P
(k−1)
J , ζ
(k−1), Q
(k−1)
S , and Q
(k−1)
J ,
solve (P4) via updating P
(k)
J using (47);
6: Given P
(k)
S , P
(k)
J , Q
(k−1)
S , and Q
(k−1)
J , update ζ
(k)
using (52);
7: Given P
(k)
S , P
(k)
J , ζ
(k), Q
(k−1)
S , Q
(k−1)
J , T
(k−1), and
U(k−1) solve (P9) for GJT/FUJ and (P11) for WoJ,
updating Q
(k)
S , T
(k), and U(k);
8: Given P
(k)
S , P
(k)
J , ζ
(k), Q
(k)
S , Q
(k−1)
J , S˜
(k−1), and
V˜(k−1) solve (P14) updating Q
(k)
J , S˜
(k), and V˜(k);
9: Until the absolute increase of the objective function is
below the threshold ǫ;
10: Return:
P⋆S ← P
(k)
S , P
⋆
J ← P
(k)
J , ζ
⋆ ← ζ (k), Q⋆S ← Q
(k)
S ,
Q⋆J ← Q
(k)
J ;
V-F Overall algorithm
In order to solve problem (P1) by using BCD method for
the jammer-included scenarios, we jointly optimize UAVs’
transmit power PS and PJ, destination’s PSR factor ζ , as well
as UAV-source and UAV-jammer’s trajectories QS and QJ
alternatively via solving sub-problems (P2), (P3), (P6), (P7),
and (P12), respectively. We summarize the detail of overall
iterative solution in Algorithm 1.
Now, aiming at convergence analysis of Algorithm 1
let define the objective value of original problem; i.e.,
(P1), at iteration k as R¯
(
PkS,P
k
J, ζ
k,QkS,Q
k
J
)
. Similar def-
initions are taken for the objective values of problems
(P4), (P9), and (P14) defined as Θlb
(
PkS,P
k
J, ζ
k,QkS,Q
k
J
)
,
Ξlb
(
PkS,P
k
J, ζ
k,QkS,Q
k
J
)
, Ωlb
(
PkS,P
k
J, ζ
k,QkS,Q
k
J
)
, respec-
tively. Now, we prove the convergence of Algorithm 1 in what
follows.
R¯
(
PkS,P
k
J, ζ
k,QkS,Q
k
J
) (a)
≤ R¯
(
P
(k+1)
S ,P
k
J, ζ
k,QkS,Q
k
J
)
(b)
= Θlb
(
P
(k+1)
S ,P
k
J, ζ
k,QkS,Q
k
J
)
(c)
≤ Θlb
(
P
(k+1)
S ,P
(k+1)
J , ζ
k,QkS,Q
k
J
)
(d)
≤ R¯
(
P
(k+1)
S ,P
(k+1)
J , ζ
k,QkS,Q
k
J
)
(e)
≤ R¯
(
P
(k+1)
S ,P
(k+1)
J , ζ
(k+1),QkS,Q
k
J
)
(f)
= Ξlb
(
P
(k+1)
S ,P
(k+1)
J , ζ
(k+1),QkS,Q
k
J
)
(g)
≤ Ξlb
(
P
(k+1)
S ,P
(k+1)
J , ζ
(k+1),Q
(k+1)
S ,Q
k
J
)
(h)
≤ R¯
(
P
(k+1)
S ,P
(k+1)
J , ζ
(k+1),Q
(k+1)
S ,Q
k
J
)
(i)
= Ωlb
(
P
(k+1)
S ,P
(k+1)
J , ζ
(k+1),Q
(k+1)
S ,Q
k
J
)
(j)
≤ Ωlb
(
P
(k+1)
S ,P
(k+1)
J , ζ
(k+1),Q
(k+1)
S ,Q
(k+1)
J
)
(k)
≤ R¯
(
P
(k+1)
S ,P
(k+1)
J , ζ
(k+1),Q
(k+1)
S ,Q
(k+1)
J
)
, (79)
where the inequalities (a), (c), (e), (g), and (j) all follow
from the definition of the optimal solution to the problems
(P2), (P4), (P6), (P9), and (P14), respectively. Besides, the
equality (b) holds since the first order Taylor approximation
is adopted and that the objective function of problems (P3)
and (P4) share the same value at PkJ. Similar justifications
can be explained for the equalities (f) and (i) at points QkS
and QkJ, respectively. Further, (d), h, and (k) follow from
the fact that the objective functions of problems (P4), (P9),
and (P14) are tight lower-bounds to that of (P3), (P7), and
(P12), respectively. The last inequality in (79) indicates that
the objective value of (P1) is non-decreasing over the iteration
index. As well as that, the optimal value of (P1) is finite,
i.e., the optimal ASR is upper bounded by a finite value,
which means the proposed iterative Algorithm 1 is guaranteed
to converge. Due to the convexity of the approximated sub-
problems (P4), (P9), and (P14), the proposed algorithm is
appropriate for UAV applications as it can be efficiently
implemented in practice as having a complexity of O(kNm),
where m is the number of variable blocks, which means the
solution can be obtained at worst-case in polynomial time.
VI NUMERICAL RESULTS
In simulations, unless otherwise stated, we adopt the fol-
lowing parameters. The mission time duration, in consistency
with [42] is chosen T = 2s which is discretized into N = 100
equal time slots to balance the accuracy and computational
complexity, the total power budget divided equally between
UAVs is P totS + P
tot
J = 20 dBm with the maximum instanta-
neous transmit power of 2mW and PAPR ratio of 4, leading to
average transmission power 0.5mW of each. Considering the
normalized transmission bandwidth, we set N0 = −40 dBm,
ΨH = −20 dBm with power conversion efficiency factor
η = 0.7 in (19). We set γ0 = 40dB and path-loss exponent
α = 2.5. We set H = 1.5 with R = 2.5H (radius of permitted
flying circular region centered at D), WD = (0, 0), L =
R
2
(distance between ground destination and geometric center of
the eavesdropper), WˆE = (L, 0), where the exact location
of E is a random point within the circular region centered
at WˆE with radius RE =
H
5 , and safety distance between
UAVs D˜ = H10 . β¯ is obtained by averaging over 10
5 channel
realizations over the area of interest. In all plots, we compare
FUJ, GJT, and WoJ in terms of the following aspects:
• convergence of the proposed iterative algorithm, demon-
strated by variation of average secrecy rate with respect to
iteration index wherein we utilized absolute error function
ferr(k)= ‖R¯
opt,k
sec − R¯
opt,k−1
sec ‖ as the termination criteria
similar to [10],
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Fig. 2: Average secrecy rate against iteration.
• optimal UAVs’ trajectory,
• instantaneous secrecy rate,
• ASR and average harvested energy (AHE) at D,
• instantaneous secrecy energy efficiency (ISEE) defined as
the ratio between R¯optsec[n] and PS [n] + PJ [n],
• UAVs’ transmit power over flying horizon,
• impact of estimated location of E on the ASR and AHE
• harvested power efficiency defined as
P˜H [n]
PS [n]+PJ [n]
.
In particular, in optimal trajectory comparisons, we adopt the
so-called baseline scheme for UAVs initial trajectory; i.e.,
both S and J fly with their maximum speeds towards as close
as D and the geometric center of estimated location of E ,
respectively. Then, both UAVs hover above the corresponding
points as long as possible in order to send the data and conduct
jamming transmission, respectively, followed by heading with
their maximum speeds towards final location, provided that the
mission time is sufficient. Otherwise, they turn from a midway
heading towards the final locations.
Fig. 2 illustrates the convergence plot of the proposed
iterative algorithms for FUJ, GJT, and WoJ. We plot the
ASR as the number of iteration k varies. We see all schemes
converge with terminating threshold ǫ = 10−2, validating
our analysis in terms of convexity of the approximated sub-
problems. It should be mentioned that Algorithm 1 for all the
scenarios converges quite quickly in few iterations making it
an efficient solution for the considered UAV application.
Fig. 3 illustrates the optimal UAVs’ trajectory for FUJ,
GJT, and WoJ using the proposed sequential algorithm. Note
the green-edge and black-edge circles denote the exact lo-
cation of D and E , respectively. We observe that, for FUJ
scheme, S gets the closest to D among all, with substantially
improved ASR. For FUJ, the operation time and energy
constraints can make J head directly to the best possible
position for jamming, which is much shorter than GJT.
Fig. 4 compares ISR of FUJ, GJT, and WoJ using the pro-
posed optimization methods and the aforementioned baseline
scheme, and demonstrates our method leads to a significant
performance improvement. We also observe that FUJ brings
always positive secrecy rate; nonetheless, WoJ provides zero
ISR at the beginning and end of the mission. Note that
since our objective function formulated to be optimized was
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scenarios.
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Fig. 4: Instantaneous secrecy rate verses time
the average secrecy rate over the mission time, so the ISR
performance is not necessarily expected to be improved at
all the mission time, though, we observe significant out-
performance compared to the base-line curves on the whole.
Particularly, it can be seen from the optimal curves belong
to the FUJ, GJT, and WoJ schemes in Fig. 4 that by jointly
optimizing transmit power of UAVs as well as their trajectories
alongside with the PSR factor we could obtain approximately
2, 1, and 0.5 bits/S/Hz ISR improvements during middle of
the mission, respectively.
Fig. 5 illustrates ASR and AHE at D vs RE (estimation
error of E’s location) in FUJ, GJT, WoJ, and demonstrates the
resultant ASRs decrease as RE increases. We observe AHE
of WoJ decreases, AHE of FUJ remains approximately un-
changed, AHE of GJT increases. This can be interpreted that,
as the uncertainty of eavesdropper’s location increases (corre-
sponding to a larger RE), for FUJ and WoJ, UAV S flies fur-
ther and has longer distance to D, resulting in decreased main
link capacity and AHE. However, for GJT, since UAV J has
quite less impact on secrecy as the wiretap link might be better
than the main link due to estimation erroneous, UAV S tries to
get as close as possible to D in a straight way for improving
ASR which, of course, makes AHE increased.
Fig. 6 is presented to draw insight into the impact of
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Fig. 6: Average Secrecy Rate vs. destination-eavesdropper
distance. y-coordinate of the eavesdropper is set to zero.
the location of the eavesdropper. As it can be clearly seen
from the figure, the farther the eavesdropper’s location from
the destination becomes, the higher the ASR performance is
obtained, as expected, for all the scenarios. Notably, having
the highest slop the curve belong to the GJT scheme is more
sensitive to this parameter in comparison with the others,
which means eavesdropper’s location has more impact on the
ASR performance of the GJT which should be considered in
system design. Further, when E gets closer to D the proposed
jamming-included scenarios could obtain positive secrecy rate
though the WoJ scheme lacks. Particularly, the FUJ scheme
regardless of the eve’s location provides the best secrecy
performance.
Fig. 7 shows ISEE vs. mission time for FUJ, GJT, and WoJ
and demonstrates the significant performance improvement of
FUJ. This ISEE plot provides a trade-off between ASR and the
cost of energy level for communications. We observe, for all
cases, decreasing the distances between (S, J ) and intended
ground nodes (D, E) leads to higher ISEE.
Fig. 8 shows UAVs’ transmit power over time horizon. For
FUJ, at the beginning S decreases its power to against infor-
mation leakage while J increases power to satisfy the required
minimum energy constraint at destination. When S and J fly
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Fig. 7: Secrecy energy efficiency vs. mission time.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Time [s]
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Tr
an
sm
it 
Po
w
er
 [m
W
]
US - FUJ
UJ - FUJ
US - GJT
UJ - GJT
US - WoJ
Fig. 8: Transmit power vs. time.
to proper positions for data transmission and jamming, trans-
mit power varies accordingly. For GJT, jamming power re-
mains lowest to avoid degradation of ASR. Finally, WoJ keeps
its power resource for the best use when having a better main
channel quality with keeping S trajectory to be as far as possi-
ble from the estimated location of E . Interestingly, we observe
that even with a significantly lower transmission power of
UAV-jammer for the GJT compared to the UAV-source, the
secrecy performance of the jammer-included scenarios could
be enhanced.
Fig. 9 is provided to demonstrate how the PSR factor varies
to make the adequate energy to be harvested by the EH
component of the destination for all the three scenarios. We
observe that for the GJT the more fraction of the received
signals should be dedicated for energy scavenging to satisfy
the energy requirement of the destination node over the time
horizon.
Fig. 10 illustrates instantaneous harvested power efficiency
for FUJ, GJT, and WoJ, with respective fraction of total power
budget PS [n] + PJ [n] and the ratio of total harvested power
to the transmit network power obtained as 6.8%, 1.8% and
7.8%, respectively. We see that, for all cases, energy harvesting
constraint is satisfied and the harvested power is well above the
minimum requirement ΨH , particularly WoJ. This indicates
that how we can design secure as well as energy efficient UAV-
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based communications protocols which is a good direction for
our future work.
VII CONCLUSION
We have considered a 2-UAV based wireless communi-
cation system. It consists of two flying cooperative UAVs,
a ground destination node equipped with SWIPT technique,
and a passive ground eavesdropper. One UAV acts as source
transmitting confidential information to destination, while the
other UAV propagates jamming to assist destination with anti-
eavesdropping and energy harvesting. Assuming that UAVs
have imperfect channel estimation eavesdropper, we have pro-
posed two transmission schemes: FUJ and GJT, transmitting
jamming signals that are a priori known and unknown at des-
tination, respectively. Under such setting, we have formulated
an average secrecy rate (ASR) maximization problem in terms
of trajectory design and power controlling, and proposed an
iterative algorithm based on the block coordinated descent and
successive convex approximation. Via this algorithm, we have
found the best transmit power and trajectory of both UAVs, as
well as the best power splitting ratio of destination. Finally, we
have evaluated the proposed schemes by simulations in terms
of ASR, ISR, AHE, and demonstrated their effectiveness. In
particular, FUJ provides by far the highest ASR improvement
compared to GJT and WoJ (the benchmark schemes).
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APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF MAXIMUM IE
First let mention a useful lemma below.
Lemma 6. Let define the bivariate function as
f(x, y) = log
(
1 +
(
x2 + h
)−a
(y2 + h)
−a
+ b
)
, (A.1)
where x, y ≥ 0 and a, b, and h are positive constants. Its
gradient can be calculated as
∇x,yf(x, y) =
[
− a2c1(c1+c2+n)
ac1
2c2(c2+n)(c1+c2+n)
]
, (A.2)
where auxiliary variables defined as c1
∆
= (H + x)−a/2 and
c2
∆
= (H + y)−a/2 are always positive. From (A.2) it follows
that the inequalities f(x, y) > f(x + ǫ, y) and f(x, y) <
f(x, y + ǫ) hold for any positive-valued ǫ.
Following from Lemma 6 we conclude that the expression
given by (5) is a monotonically decreasing function with
respect to the term ‖QS(t) − WE‖ and a monotonically
increasing function with respect to the term ‖QJ(t) −WE‖.
Then, from linear algebra and applying the regular and the
reverse triangular inequality, one can obtain as
‖QJ(t)−WE‖ ≤ ‖QJ(t)− WˆE‖+ ‖WˆE −WE‖
≤ ‖QJ(t)− WˆE‖+RE . (A.3)
and
‖QS(t)−WE‖ ≥ |‖QS(t)− WˆE‖ − ‖WˆE −WE‖|
≥ |‖QS(t)− WˆE‖ −RE |. (A.4)
Then, plugging the lower and upper deterministic expressions
respectively given in (A.3) and (A.4) into (5), leads to the final
expression of ImaxE (t) as given in (6).
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We commence from the concavity of the function f(x) =
−‖x− a‖2 with the gradient equal to ∇f(x) = −2(x− a) as
f(x)
(a)
≤ −‖xk − a‖2 − 2(xk − a)(x− xk)
= −‖xk‖2 + 2a†xk − ‖a‖2 − 2(xk − a)†(x− xk)
= ‖xk‖2 − ‖a‖2 − 2(xk − a)†x (B.1)
where (a) follows after the fact that the first order Taylor
approximation of a concave function is a global affine over-
estimator of the function f(x) at the point x0.
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